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Abstract.  The current trend in space science is for payload developers to minimize program cost and 
schedule while conducting useful science.  One problem with the design, integration, and testing of low-
cost missions is that much of the savings results from the assumption of risk.  Analyzing lessons learned 
from high-risk programs is an effective means for increasing success while meeting budget and schedule 
constraints.  University efforts, such as the University Nanosat Program (UNP), are faced with the 
seemingly contradictory goals of mission success and low cost while designing revolutionary 
experiments.  Currently planned for a shuttle launch, UNP is subject to rigorous qualification 
requirements resulting from NASA’s manned spaceflight safety program.  Universities have limited 
experience with the design, integration, and test of flight hardware for manned spaceflight.  The program 
has identified many areas for improvement.  This paper explores the effects of various program and 
technical approaches--those that worked, and those that didn’t.  Design, integration and test, configuration 
management, quality assurance, and safety are considered.  Lessons learned from the University Nanosat 
Program are expected to be the basis for success in launching future university-built technology.    
 
Introduction 
 
A promising way to perform many space missions 
is to use clusters of microsatellites that operate 
cooperatively to perform the function of a larger, 
single satellite.  The University Nanosat program 
(UNP) is a collaborative effort between the 
AFRL/VS, the Air Force Office of Scientific 
Research (AFOSR), the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Space 
Test Program (STP), and NASA/GSFC, to explore 
this shift in paradigm.   
 
The program consists of multiple nanosatellites 
(nanosats) designed and built by US universities 
that are baselined to deploy from the Space Shuttle 
via the Shuttle Hitchhiker Experiment Launch 
System (SHELS).   The nanosats are being built 
through university team efforts.   Santa Clara 
University, Stanford and MIT are building the 
  SSC02-X-2 
2 
                         
Peffer                       16th Annual USU Conference on Small Satellites 
Emerald and Orion spacecraft. Utah State 
University, University of Washington, and 
Virginia Tech are building three nanosats known 
as ION-F, and Arizona State University, New 
Mexico State University and the University of 
Colorado at Boulder have constructed the Three 
Corner Sat (3CS) nanosats.  For both flights, the 
nanosats are mounted on an AFRL-built 
integrating structure known as the Multiple 
Satellite Deployment System (MSDS).    
 
The current UNP flight compliment, dubbed 
Nanosat-2, consists of the 3CS hardware mounted 
on the MSDS.  Integration and test of Nanosat-2 is 
completed and the payload is awaiting manifest at 
AFRL.  The Nanosat-2 payload is scheduled to fly 
on the Space Shuttle in late CY 03.  A schematic 
of the launch scenario is shown in Figure 1, and 
the flight hardware is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  University Nanosat Program Concept 
 
 Throughout the program, AFRL has been 
responsible for program management, preparation 
of NASA-required documentation including safety 
documentation, integration and testing of the 
payload, and evaluation of university designs.  
From this vantage point, AFRL has accumulated a 
tremendous amount of experience in working with 
universities and students, developing and 
integrating multiple small satellites, and 
negotiating the NASA manned space flight safety 
process.  This experience has resulted in a 
valuable list of lessons learned which is 
documented in this paper, and hopefully can be 
used by other programs both in the Shuttle and 
expendable launch vehicle environments.   These 
lessons are summarized in the following sections. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Nanosat-2 Flight Hardware  
 
Safety Documentation 
 
The greatest challenge to the UNP has been 
navigating and implementing the NASA manned 
space flight safety process, a procedure being 
undertaken for the first time by many program 
participants.  Aside from hardware design, build, 
and test, many lessons learned were generated in 
the area of required safety documentation.  One 
basic issue is to ensure that the universities 
understand the quantity of documentation 
involved.  This can by done by providing 
examples.  However two related lessons learned 
were generated: efficient preparation of 
documents, and avoiding generation of 
unnecessary documents.  
 
Before discussing lessons learned, a brief 
overview of the safety process is warranted.  The 
safety process comprises three phases of safety 
 
Multiple  
Satellite 
Deployment  
System (AFRL) 
Lightband  
Separation 
 System  
(Planetary 
Systems 
Corp.) 
Clamp Band  
Separation 
Systems 
(Starsys 
Research 
Corporation) 
3CS 
Nanosats 
  SSC02-X-2 
3 
                         
Peffer                       16th Annual USU Conference on Small Satellites 
reviews (Phases 0/1, 2, and 3) conducted by the 
JSC Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP).  For 
each phase, documents must be developed that 
analyze the payload for hazards and detail the 
means by which safety is verified.  Examples of 
documents are Flight and Ground Safety Data 
Packages that provide a detailed description and 
safety analysis of the payload, Structural and 
Mechanical Verification Plans, a Fracture Control 
Plan, and a detailed materials list. For each 
hazardous system identified in the safety analysis, 
a hazard report, which identifies hazard causes, 
controls, and means of verifying that the controls 
are present, must be generated.  The verifications 
are heavily scrutinized by NASA safety and 
eventually become the checklist of actions that 
must be satisfied before a payload can fly.  
Verifications consist of tests, analysis, inspections, 
reports, and procedures, and are first developed by 
the payloader as part of their documentation.   
 
The lessons learned in efficiency focused on 
effective transmittal of information from 
universities to AFRL.  For the UNP, AFRL was 
the overall preparer of the documents; however, 
the universities contributed the material relevant to 
their spacecraft mostly via e-mail.  One of the 
problems encountered in this process was the 
delay caused by the review and comment cycle 
between the universities and AFRL.  Students had 
very little experience with technical writing, 
especially related to safety documentation, and 
also had a high turnover rate.  On the other hand, 
as the program progressed, AFRL’s collective 
experience with safety documentation increased, 
with the same personnel working on all of the 
payload elements.  Once the Phase 0/1 review took 
place for the first flight, a more efficient approach 
would have been for the AFRL safety engineer to 
do all of the technical writing based on face-to-
face conversations with university engineers and 
visual inspection of the hardware or prototypes.  
This would have saved time in review and rewrite 
cycles with the students, allowed the AFRL side of 
the program to obtain a better familiarity with the 
university hardware, and taken the burden off the 
universities to provide a safety engineer.   
 
Another important lesson focused on control of the 
scope of requirements imposed by the verifications 
listed in the hazard reports.  This is a subject that 
provides the connection between payload safety 
and design and will be discussed in the next 
section “Design Engineering”, as well.  The 
hazard report verifications define a set of 
requirements that is essentially unique to the 
payload and can be controlled by the payload 
organization.  The most obvious way to minimize 
these requirements is simply to design a payload 
with a minimal number of hazardous systems.  
However, for those systems where hazard reports 
must be developed, it is possible for an 
inexperienced payload organization to 
inadvertently burden itself with unnecessary 
documentation requirements. In developing 
verifications, the payloader must meet safety 
requirements, but at the same time generate the 
minimum amount of paper required to prove that 
the payload is safe.   
 
A good example was the numerous hazard report 
verifications which indicated that the program 
would prepare “inspection procedures and 
inspection reports” for various steps in the 
hardware build-up.  These documents were 
specified in some cases for installations that were 
entered into the build certification logs as standard 
practice.  All of the steps entered into the build log 
were verified and signed off by a second party.  
Therefore, in order to establish that the verification 
had been met, there was little need for 
development of an inspection report and 
procedure.  In reviewing the hazard report 
verifications, NASA reviewers are more 
concerned about safety issues than advising the 
payload on how to eliminate documentation.   
Another example occurred wherein universities 
developed detailed build procedures with sign-out 
blocks but also completed detailed certification 
logs for the same processes.  Therefore, this was a 
duplicated effort.   
 
Although these lessons learned apply to 
documentation, it is probably obvious that design 
and generation of safety documentation are inter-
related because of the need to prove that the 
payload is safe.  Lessons learned related to 
documentation are summarized in Table 1.  The 
second half of the picture, design and engineering, 
is discussed in the next section. 
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Table 1.  Summary of Lessons Learned: 
Safety Documentation 
 
Lessons Learned 
Recognize the quantity of required 
documentation early.  Review examples from 
similar programs. 
Generate documentation efficiently.  The 
technical writer should be in direct contact with 
hardware builders, and know the hardware well. 
Limit required documentation by minimizing 
documentation for hazard report verifications.  
Provide only what is necessary to prove safety.   
 
Design Engineering 
 
For shuttle projects, working the issues of design 
and safety in parallel will likely result in time and 
cost savings.   Proving that a design is safe can 
result in a tremendous cost in document 
development, tests, and, analysis.  The key is to 
design hardware with the safety requirements in 
mind and to come up with a design for which 
safety is easy to prove, i.e. the required tests, 
analysis, and inspections are within the budget and 
capability of the university.  In other words, as 
discussed in the previous section, the payload must 
try to minimize the scope of requirements by 
minimizing the hazard report verifications.  
Therefore, from the design standpoint, the basic 
idea is to design non-hazardous systems with no 
hazard reports or to design systems with a minimal 
number of verifications that are easy to 
accomplish.  Lessons learned identify ways in 
which this approach can be supported and are 
based on the design review process, understanding 
how safety problems in design can affect the 
program as a whole, and use of common designs.  
 
One of the lessons learned early in the UNP 
program was the need to eliminate potentially 
troublesome designs prior to the Phase 0/1 safety 
review.   As an example, the UNP program 
presented a mechanism design to the PSRP at the 
Phase 0/1 safety review that contained features 
that were out of the scope of typical aerospace 
practice.  Although there was some concern raised 
about the designs prior to the review, some of the 
features in question were not addressed in the 
NASA safety requirements.  At the review, the 
safety panel was uncomfortable with the design 
and raised numerous issues including technical 
questions, quality assurance issues, and simply 
how to categorize the design within the NASA 
safety requirements.  The program left the review 
with action items whose resolution consumed a 
large amount of student time.   These efforts 
involved redesign of the systems, which required 
resolution of the technical issues, developing a 
presentation and reconvening with the safety panel 
to represent the designs, not to mention several 
review cycles with STP, AFRL, and GSFC prior to 
the safety review.   After the items were finally 
resolved, AFRL realized that the resolution of the 
action item consumed too many resources for all 
parties.  AFRL later requested a redesign of 
several mechanisms that were questionable based 
on the Phase 0/1 review.  The redesigns resulted in 
greatly simplified mechanisms, elimination of 
hazard reports, and a few questions from the safety 
panel.   
 
Successful incorporation of the previous lessons 
learned obviously relies on the availability of 
experienced reviewers from numerous disciplines 
at all levels, such as engineers, technicians, and 
management.  Although there are numerous 
NASA safety documents, translation of safety 
requirements into design implementation is not 
obvious sometimes.  In addition, there is very little 
hardware that is officially “approved” by NASA 
because the prevailing philosophy is that each 
design is reviewed for safety on a case-by-case 
basis.   As the UNP program progressed, AFRL 
had the advantage of reviewing several nanosat 
designs developed by universities, and of going 
through the Phase 0/1 safety review.  Therefore, 
the AFRL reviewers developed skills in evaluating 
designs for safety, and recognizing designs that 
would likely result in action items or  requirements 
from the PSRP.  The following is a list of several 
of these items:  
 
· When purchasing hardware, especially 
components that contain non-metallic 
items, obtain a materials list first and 
ensure that all materials meet the 
outgassing requirements listed on the 
NASA Materials websites.   
· Eliminate mechanisms that rely on friction 
as a means of retention.  This could mean 
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linear screws, crimps, gears, etc.  Ensure 
that the only means of inadvertent release 
is through failure of a structural, metallic 
part.  Ensure that the part is easy to 
analyze, i.e. the load path in all 
environments is clear and that materials 
properties are well understood. 
· Eliminate structural or mechanical 
components that are epoxied or glued 
together, particularly for structures in the 
primary load path, and in mechanisms for 
which inadvertent deployment is a hazard.  
· Eliminate “soft goods” such as cables, 
lines, and wires used in structural 
applications or retention type applications.  
These items raise many questions 
regarding structural load path, creep, 
thermal effects, integrity of connections, 
(for example, knots or crimps) and rigging 
procedures for flight.  
· Eliminate composites in the primary load 
path.  Composites include aluminum 
honeycomb, metallic structure that is 
epoxied or glued together in any way, or 
traditional composite materials.  
· Eliminate items for which safety is highly 
dependent upon the build or assembly 
process.   One example is composites used 
in primary load paths.  If composites must 
be used, professionals, not students, 
should do manufacturing.  Also, 
setting/rigging of complex safety critical 
mechanisms should be done by the 
manufacturer. 
· Design bolted interfaces with redundant 
fasteners.  Examine use of fasteners in 
accordance with NASA fracture control 
and fastener integrity documents.  
Eliminate single point failure fasteners. 
· Consider fracture control in accordance 
with NASA-STD-5003 from the outset of 
design.  Ensure that there are no fracture- 
critical components in the design and that 
it is easy to prove that items are non-
fracture critical.   Examples are design of 
structures with redundant load paths,  and 
structures that are built from well-
understood, machined metals, with low 
stresses.   
· Incorporate pressure relief devices in 
high-pressure systems, even when 
redundant reducing valves are used.   
· Incorporate fuses in electrical systems 
even if the systems will not be energized 
on the Shuttle. 
 
All of the items on this list presented problems in 
the UNP program and resulted in cost and 
schedule impacts; however, many are not 
thoroughly addressed in the NASA safety 
requirements.  The lesson is that when confronted 
with a design that is not specifically addressed in 
the safety requirements or is outside of standard 
aerospace practice, NASA safety reviewers will 
recommend very conservative approaches for 
proof of safety.  Note that NASA safety reviewers 
will not recommend alternative designs if the 
design presented results in numerous safety 
requirements.  They only review and provide 
recommendations on what is presented to them.  
Therefore, if conservative recommendations 
translate into too many requirements and action 
items for the payloader’s budget, the burden is on 
the payloader to redesign and re-present to NASA.  
With this in mind the program management should 
have the ability to veto potentially troublesome 
designs early or force the designer to choose only 
the one or two problematic items that they feel 
they can best defend. 
 
Another lesson learned related to design was 
implementation of commonality.  Although 
commonality is almost always a benefit, it is even 
more so when considered in the light of payload 
safety.  One example concerns the batteries used 
in the UNP.  The UNP made very little effort from 
the beginning to standardize a battery box design 
or a cell acceptance test plan even though all of the 
nanosats and the MSDS were using Sanyo NiCd 
batteries, and the battery design is an area that is 
heavily scrutinized by NASA.  Therefore, there 
were four different battery box designs used in the 
program and all participants purchased batteries 
from different sources.  This resulted in 
development of separate documentation for each 
battery because different battery containers had 
different safety features.   Also cell acceptance 
tests differed from one participant to another.  
Therefore, it was difficult to present a unified 
safety picture to NASA. Battery container and 
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battery testing is generally not an area where 
anyone should expend resources in innovation and 
this should have been recognized earlier.   
 
Other examples of instances where commonality 
did help in the UNP were the purchase of all 
fasteners from GSFC to ensure compatibility with 
NASA requirements, and standardization on 
electrical inhibit relays.  In the future, 
standardization could expand to structural buses, 
flight computers, and power systems.  Students 
can still learn a great deal about aerospace 
practices by assembling, installing, and testing 
standard systems, while maintaining more time 
consuming innovative efforts at a manageable 
level.  Commonality should also apply to program-
wide software such as CAD systems and analysis 
packages. 
 
Other basic design principles take on even more 
significance when working with the Shuttle safety 
process.  These principles are not necessarily 
lessons learned but should be considered carefully 
especially when working with first-time builders: 
 
· Develop prototypes and engineering 
design units.  This will give first-time 
builders some experience in hands-on 
build up and will allow qualification 
tests/fit checks to be done. 
· Early identification of areas where 
additional resources are needed, such as 
test, safety engineering, software, satellite 
fabrication guidance, and analysis 
expertise. 
· Keep satellite designs simple:  Design 
based on capabilities and experience of the 
people who are doing the work. 
 
Lessons learned related to design engineering are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Summary of Lessons Learned: 
Design Engineering 
 
Lessons Learned 
Work safety and design in parallel to avoid 
common pitfalls. 
Limit hazard report verification requirements 
(tests, analysis, inspections) through design.  
Consider the difficulties of proving safety before 
committing to a design. 
Review designs early using experienced 
reviewers.  Be familiar with approaches that 
make the PSRP uncomfortable.  Eliminate 
questionable designs before Phase 0/1 safety. 
Implement commonality wherever possible to 
limit the variety of safety verifications and 
present a unified approach to the PSRP. 
 
Configuration Management (CM) and Quality 
Assurance (QA) 
 
One key element that must be treated early in the 
program is ensuring that proper hardware 
fabrication and building techniques are impressed 
upon students.  One critical aspect of satellite 
construction that students are often unaware of is 
QA and CM techniques.  QA and CM are 
important for both safety and mission success, and 
students need to be educated in these areas before 
hardware build begins.  To an extent this was 
something that was done well by the UNP.  
Important QA practices were impressed on the 
universities early, such as two-person build and 
verification, maintenance of certification logs, and 
tracking of hardware (fasteners).  These practices 
were documented by AFRL in a detailed CM and 
QA plan, which was passed on to the students and 
approved by NASA.   
 
AFRL also conducted a satellite fabrication 
courses and sent experienced representatives to the 
universities for configuration management 
reviews. Unfortunately, although the CM review 
and fabrication course were effective, they were 
done too late in the process, after a significant 
amount of build-up was completed.  The reason 
this occurred was most likely poor communication 
between the universities and AFRL, wherein 
AFRL did not know the universities’ build 
schedule.   If a representative from AFRL could 
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have visited the universities during some of their 
early or more critical build up efforts, some 
problems with CM documentation may have been 
avoided.  
 
Lessons Learned from CM and QA are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Summary of Lessons Learned: 
Configuration Management and Quality 
Assurance. 
 
Lessons Learned 
Educate students early in CM and QA.  Develop 
a program-wide plan for implementing CM and 
QA. 
Provide direct assistance to students during 
hardware build-up to verify students’ knowledge 
of basic CM and QA. 
 
Integration and Test 
 
The integration process for UNP, i.e. integration of 
the University-built satellites with the AFRL-built 
MSDS went very smoothly, primarily because the 
interfaces were simple, well-defined, and were 
communicated to the universities early with few 
subsequent changes.  This allowed easy 
configuration changes when some difficulties 
arose during testing.  One important lesson learned 
in the I&T process was related to testing and the 
need for experienced personnel to review 
university test setups.    
 
In the UNP program the universities had very little 
responsibility for testing, as the final payload was 
to be tested in an integrated state after arrival at 
AFRL.  Most testing conducted at the universities  
was for mission success/confidence.  However, 
there was a requirement imposed by AFRL that 
the first mode frequency of the nanosats must be a 
certain value or greater, such that the integrated 
payload could meet the Shuttle stiffness 
requirement.  The universities had sine sweep 
testing conducted by an outside laboratory that 
resulted in a first mode frequency that was 
significantly lower than what was expected.  When 
AFRL reviewed the test data and setup, the test 
configuration, specifically the interface to the vibe 
table, was immediately suspected.  Since at the 
time the universities were ready to deliver to 
AFRL, the delivery took place and the system was 
re-tested at AFRL.  The stiffness was significantly 
higher in the AFRL test with an improved 
interface fixture.  The lesson learned in this case 
was that AFRL could have assisted with reviewing 
the university test setup even though the test was 
conducted by an outside laboratory.  A better 
awareness of the university build and test schedule 
would have helped with this as well, because 
AFRL was not aware of the test until after it 
happened.   
 
Although integration for the UNP generally was 
not a problem, a few areas were identified wherein 
the government can and should provide early 
support.  These areas are development and 
operation of lifting hardware considering all 
phases of the program, proper design and 
operation of ground support equipment, and 
construction of hardware shipping containers.   
These are subjects that are important but often take 
a much lower priority than construction of the 
satellite itself. Government integration and test 
facilities tend to have personnel with experience 
with these matters whereas universities do not. 
 
Lessons learned related to integration and test are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.   Summary of Lessons Learned: 
Integration and Test 
 
Lessons Learned 
Define interfaces early. 
Review university test set-ups, even if they are 
performed by professional laboratories. 
Provide government support on auxiliary 
operations such as lifting, transportation, and 
ground operations. 
 
University Lessons Learned 
 
This section focuses on lessons learned that are 
particularly relevant to universities’ in house 
efforts on the UNP.  Some lessons learned are 
unique to the universities, and others reflect and 
support the program-level issues that have been 
discussed so far.   
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The process of hardware design and build is a 
balance between meeting program requirements 
such as safety, mission, and schedule, and 
allowing students to be educated through design 
and redesign processes.  To help ensure success, it 
is important to evaluate capabilities and arrive at a 
feasible conceptual design early in the program.  
Even having arrived at what appears to be a 
feasible design, universities should be consistently 
evaluating progress and have the ability to de-
scope if necessary.  There are many reasons that 
even a simple design can become problematic 
later, for example, unforeseen safety issues, 
requirements creep, or expected resources that do 
not materialize.   However, the challenges that 
arise because of design failures or unexpected 
problems, and the need to evaluate and re-design 
are part of the education process.   
 
In addition to developing feasible designs, which 
rely heavily on experience, several additional 
design-related strategies can help offset 
inexperience.   Students found that purchasing 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components 
where possible instead of building hardware in-
house played a large part in minimizing CM and 
QA requirements.  Provided that the product could 
meet safety issues (materials, structure etc.), the 
QA was provided by the manufacturer and the 
manufacturer’s Certificate of Compliance met 
most of the CM needs.  Building EDUs is also a 
helpful strategy both to assure quality and to 
educate.  For example the EDU will reveal a 
design’s strengths and weaknesses and provide the 
students with experience in hardware build, even if 
elements of the flight unit are eventually 
outsourced to a professional manufacturer.   
Finally, developing CM and QA document 
templates from the outset of the program will help 
ensure that documentation is simple and of high 
quality, and that common formats are available to 
all program participants.   
 
Because of the complexity and interdisciplinary 
nature of spacecraft development, the need for 
dedicated, experienced assistance is of great 
importance.  Both students and professors have 
highlighted the importance of qualified mentors, 
particularly those that can be present at critical 
times.   Universities have faculty available in all 
engineering disciplines, and personnel from all 
fields must be available to assist.   The availability 
of government personnel to provide hands-on 
assistance is important as well.  As the delivery 
date for 3CS approached, AFRL did send an 
experienced technician to assist with final build on 
three occasions.  The students indicated that it was 
very helpful to have this experienced assistance in 
making decisions and moving forward when the 
time schedule was getting tight.  However, they 
also indicated that more visits from qualified 
individuals would have been helpful throughout 
the program not only for hardware development 
but for documentation assistance as well.   As 
stated previously , the students found that the 
satellite fabrication course offered by AFRL was 
helpful, but should have been done sooner.  In 
general, face-to-face mentoring is required 
throughout the program.    
 
Program management issues for universities focus 
on good communication among university 
participants, continuity in the workforce, and 
subdivision of tasks.  Communication within the 
university teams is critical particularly when 
multiple universities are involved.  Students have 
indicated that the familiarity obtained from face-
to-face meetings with students from other 
participating universities allowed work to proceed 
more efficiently, and greatly improved teamwork.   
In addition, in cases where satellite subsystem 
design is assigned to different universities, an 
effort should be made to educate all participants in 
the design and operation of all systems.  This will 
greatly aid in component integration and 
documentation development.   Also subdivision of 
the program into smaller tasks, whatever the 
program structure, is important to keep students 
from being overwhelmed by subjects with which 
they are not familiar.  Universities should also 
establish a common project website to collect and 
organize materials such as requirements, designs, 
datasheets, etc. so that they may be available to 
everyone.   Use of such tools as an organized 
website, improved teaming through face-to-face 
meetings, and good program documentation in 
general will not only help the program run 
smoothly day-to-day but will help combat issues 
of continuity in workforce that arise when students 
graduate, move on to other programs, etc. 
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One final important issue is motivation.  The best 
means of obtaining of obtaining quality work and 
maintaining student motivation is simply to pay 
the students for their work.  Students have also 
indicated that major motivators are the ability to 
interact with government and industry and thus 
obtain experience and training after graduation.  
The opportunity to build and fly space hardware is 
another motivator.  It is important that all 
participants understand the level of motivation of 
the student workforce because of the large amount 
of work involved in a Shuttle flight and the need to 
recognize where assistance is needed.   
 
University lessons learned are summarized in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Summary of University Lessons 
Learned: 
 
Lessons Learned 
Assess feasibility of conceptual designs early and 
have the flexibility to descope if problems are 
encountered late in the design.   
Ensure that students have dedicated, experienced 
mentors both from the university and 
government. 
Ensure good communication between university 
team members, through face-to-face meetings 
and websites. 
Subdivide the program into smaller tasks for 
students so that they can more easily handle 
unfamiliar areas, such as program management 
or CM. 
 
Program Management 
  
Program management lessons learned are focused 
primarily on ensuring success despite university 
inexperience and managing government/university 
interaction.  The most important part of ensuring 
success is to have good strategies for university 
design assessment.  Designs must be reviewed 
regularly and efficiently, not only to identify 
deficiencies, but also to identify where universities 
need outside help before problems begin.  Another 
important topic is the need to establish a good 
government/university interaction in which each 
party understands the other’s goals, mode of 
operation, and capabilities.  These topics are 
discussed in the next subsections.   
 
Design Assessment 
 
The subject of early design review has been 
discussed earlier in the context of avoiding safety 
problems.  Another more basic area that must be 
assessed is the universities’ ability to deliver 
innovative hardware whether there are safety 
issues or not.  On the university side, there is a 
need to propose design concepts commensurate 
with technical capabilities.  In order for the 
government to provide input, design review and 
evaluation should begin earlier than PDR or Phase 
0/1 safety.  Making the review process a 
competition between universities may be an 
effective tool.  For example, rather than evaluating 
the designs based solely on the quality and 
quantity of science experiments involved, the 
ability of the universities to accomplish the 
proposed design using a student workforce and 
available resources would be evaluated and 
factored in the competition as well.  Points of 
evaluation may be:  simplicity of the design, 
ability to pass safety, amount of documentation 
generated, need for outside special technical 
capabilities, and/or ability to stay on schedule and 
within budget.  Because of the design and safety 
issues discussed earlier, it is difficult to produce 
hardware that is innovative, low budget, and can 
meet the Shuttle requirements. Therefore, the 
universities would have to convince the reviewers 
that they could accomplish both goals, or face 
elimination from the program. 
 
In addition to simply reviewing design concepts, 
another benefit of early evaluation is identification 
of areas in which universities may need help.  This 
can include technical help in such areas as 
structural and thermal analysis, hardware build, or 
use of test facilities.  Other areas that may be 
pitfalls are negotiation with other government 
agencies that may be involved, (providing the 
universities with experimental hardware), 
arranging bulk purchases of common equipment, 
and assisting with administrative issues such as 
International Trade in Arms Restrictions (ITAR).    
All of these issues came up in the UNP; some 
were dealt with successfully and others were not.  
However, once again universities and government 
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should work together early to anticipate these 
items.  
 
Of course the need to review design items is 
continuous throughout the entire project, and this 
leads to the need for structured review and 
comment cycles.  Readiness for design reviews 
such as PDR and CDR are often defined in terms 
of completeness of documentation, such as 
drawings and analysis.  In addition, some of the 
safety verifications required by NASA were 
simply reviews of university documents by AFRL 
representatives.  A good document review policy 
was never established by the UNP; therefore, 
many design documents were reviewed after the 
fact, i.e. after the hardware was built.  This 
obviously hindered success in many ways and ties 
into the need for better communication.  Some 
things that must be considered are prioritizing 
safety or mission critical review items, generation 
and review of procedures with time to incorporate 
changes, and using the level of documentation 
development as a gauge of program status.   
 
University/Government Interaction 
 
The first lessons learned that will be discussed in 
this section involve the need for government and 
universities to have a common understanding of 
basic program issues.  These issues are interrelated 
and involve communication, scheduling, goals, 
and developing reasonable expectations of the 
student workforce.  Government engineering 
programs are inherently different from those of 
universities especially in the case where students 
are performing most of the work, i.e. the student 
work force is different than a government 
contractor.  A university in a low-budget, high-risk 
situation may not be able to alleviate problems by 
adding additional funds or experienced personnel.  
Therefore, although the university PI’s should take 
responsibility for solving management level 
problems, the program will still rely on a student 
workforce, and, therefore, all parties must agree on 
some limitations that come with that workforce. 
 
One of the most basic concepts is the need for the 
government and universities to account for 
students’ schedules.  Students have other 
obligations and priorities such as exams, class 
work, and projects, all related to their ability to 
graduate.  The lesson learned is that the 
government has to have realistic expectations of 
student work schedules and the universities have 
to communicate a realistic schedule to the 
government.  For example, if it is not realistic that 
work will be accomplished over exam periods or 
scheduled vacations, it is better to simply account 
for that down time in the schedule.  The 
experience from the UNP was that although there 
were students working on the program during 
vacations, usually some key personnel were not 
available.  Recognition of these downtimes is a 
good way to avoid friction from the outset and will 
have a positive effect on morale.  Early in the 
program, government personnel would view 
breaks as times in which the universities could get 
caught up on work.  This was not always true, for 
obvious reasons such as students’ planned 
vacations, but also because semester breaks were 
often the point at which student turnover occurred 
due to graduations and, therefore, new personnel 
had to be brought up to speed at those times.   
 
Another important item to take into account 
regarding schedule is the inevitable redesigns that 
take place due to the difficulty of meeting NASA 
safety requirements.  The university students were 
often designing spacecraft systems for the first 
time and most people involved including PI’s had 
minimal experience with NASA safety.   As 
discussed earlier, one of the lessons learned on the 
UNP program is that the government program 
management needs to identify and eliminate 
designs that are potential safety problems early on.  
However, because of inexperience and low budget, 
initial student efforts will often incorporate 
elements that are outside the scope of standard 
aerospace design and may have problems meeting 
safety requirements.  In these cases the schedule 
needs to account for redesigns and the government 
should be prepared to provide technical assistance.   
 
Government organizations and universities should 
also have a mutual understanding of goals.   For 
the government, the goal of university programs is 
obviously to access and demonstrate university-
developed space technology.  The program is also 
a recruiting and workforce training tool for future 
scientists and engineers; a benefit for all.  For 
universities and students, education and 
technology are both goals.  However, the 
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government’s expectation going into the project 
should be that student education takes precedence.  
For example, documentation, presentations, and 
safety items may be prioritized lower than design 
and hardware build.  This can cause problems 
early in the process where most of the deliverable 
items consist of documentation.  One solution may 
simply be more direct support of university 
document development by the government.  
Another approach is to only allow simple designs 
for which the documentation is less complex 
(particularly for Shuttle safety) so that the 
paperwork can be accomplished reasonably well 
by students.   In any case the important point is to 
combine government experience with the 
universities’ ability to conduct advanced research 
on a low budget.     
  
Good communication between the government 
and universities is a common theme in the 
previous paragraphs.  The UNP program 
employed some successful basic communication 
practices such as regular integration telecons with 
students, and an FTP site where program 
documentation of all types could be exchanged 
between AFRL, NASA, and the universities.  
There were also some areas that could have been 
improved.  A better knowledge of university 
schedules on the part of AFRL, such as the 
hardware build schedule would have been 
beneficial to both organizations.  In addition, 
universities indicated a desire for AFRL to better 
indicate the priorities of deliverables such as data, 
documents, procedures, etc. so they could improve 
resource management.  
 
Program Management lessons learned are 
summarized in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.   Summary of Lessons Learned: 
Program Management 
 
Lessons Learned 
When planning schedules/events, acknowledge 
that student schedules vary greatly from industry. 
Allow for safety redesigns in program planning. 
Government/universities should recognize each 
other’s program goals and plan accordingly. 
Universities should prove that they have the 
capability to deliver hardware. 
Identify areas where universities will need 
outside support early in the program. 
Establish a structured document review process. 
 
Summary 
 
The lessons learned discussed in this paper bring 
out some common themes that can be applied to 
government/university programs, particularly 
those that are Shuttle flights.  The lessons illustrate 
the need for mutual understanding of program 
goals and schedules, the need for early 
identification of problem areas especially related 
to safety, and identification of areas where 
students and universities require government 
assistance, both technical and non-technical.  With 
these concepts in mind, university satellite build 
programs can be successful, provided that the 
designs are within the capabilities of the students.  
The government participants must have sufficient 
experience to effectively evaluate university 
designs so that success is possible, and so that 
costs and schedule remain within limits.   
Government and universities also need to 
communicate effectively so that the more 
experienced government personnel can provide 
timely assistance to universities as needed.  The 
UNP has been a success, considering the initial 
lack of experience on the part of most participants.  
As a result of the UNP, AFRL has gained a vast 
amount of experience in university satellite 
programs that it will apply to follow-on efforts.   
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